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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court, which had original jurisdiction
over this case pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2(3) j, transferred this case
to the Utah Court of Appeals under U.C.A. 78-2-2(4).

This Court

has jurisdiction of the above-captioned case pursuant to U.C.A. 782a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE #1
Should
Manufacturing

the

lower

Company,

court

Inc.'s

have

granted

B.W.

Norton

(,,Norton/s") motion for summary

judgment on the basis that Appellant National Services Industries,
Inc. (MNSIM) failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 4-501 of
the Code of Judicial Administration?
ISSUE #2
Does NSI have standing to appeal from summary judgment
granted in favor of a non-adverse co-defendant?
ISSUE #3
Did the lower court correctly hold that Norton is a
component part manufacturer?
ISSUE #4
Did the lower court correctly hold that Norton's component
parts were not in a defective condition when they left Norton?
ISSUE #5
Did the lower court correctly hold that component part
manufacturers have no duty to anticipate how their parts might be

assembled into final products or to warn end users of possible
dangers associated with such final products?
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ALL ISSUES
Because the trial court decided these issues as a matter of
law, this court should review the trial court's conclusions for
correctness.

State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App.1991)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR NORTON SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
BECAUSE NSI FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF RULE 4-501 OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION IN THE PROCEEDING BELOW
In the proceedings below, Norton filed its motion for

summary judgment on March 21, 1994, and NSI's response was due on
or before March 31, 1994.
Administration.]

[Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial

NSI filed its response on April 12, 1994, almost

two weeks late and after Norton had already filed a notice to
submit its motion for summary judgment for decision.

Because NSI

failed to comply with Rule 4-501, this court should affirm summary
judgment for Norton on the basis that it was unopposed below and
NSI's opposition was never properly raised.
II.

NSI LACKS STANDING TO APPEAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED IN
FAVOR OF NORTON
It is well-settled that a party has no standing to appeal

from judgment granted in favor of a non-adverse party.
Norton were co-defendants below.

NSI and

When NSI settled with plaintiff

(the only party adverse to NSI), it resolved the only dispute in
which it was involved.

NSI was never adverse to Norton, and
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therefore lacks standing to appeal from summary judgment granted in
Norton's favor.
III.

NORTON IS A MANUFACTURER OF COMPONENT PARTS
Norton manufactures component parts from which a variety of

containers

of

different

characteristics

may

be

constructed.

Norton's only duty, unless informed of any specific requirements by
the customer, is to provide non-defective component parts.

In

purchasing Norton parts to build their containers, NSI did not
inform Norton of any specific requirements the finished containers
must meet or otherwise consult Norton at any stage in the process.
Norton's

only

duty,

therefore, was

to

provide

non-defective

component parts.
IV.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY NORTON PART WAS DEFECTIVE
There is simply no evidence in the record to even suggest

that any Norton part was defective when it left Norton. NSI quotes
extensively from the deposition testimony of Dr. Noel de Nevers in
attempting to demonstrate that a factual question exists as to
whether Norton sold defective products.

Dr. de Nevers, however,

never expressed an opinion that any Norton product was defective.
Additionally, NSI's own representative has stated that he has no
information

indicating

that

parts

supplied

defective. As the lower court correctly noted:

by

Norton

were

M

[e]ngineers from

NSI had no opinion that the steel pail components were defective.
No expert in the case has rendered such an opinion."
19-21).

3

(R. p.253, 1.

V.

NORTON, AS A MANUFACTURER OF NON-DEFECTIVE COMPONENT PARTS,
OWED NO DUTY TO WARN PLAINTIFF OF DANGERS WHICH AROSE
THROUGH THE INCORPORATION OF NORTON PARTS INTO A CONTAINER
IMPROPERLY DESIGNED BY A THIRD PARTY
Given

the

lack of evidence

in the record

suggesting

Norton's parts were defective, the lower court correctly held that
"under the circumstances . . . Norton did not have a duty to warn11
plaintiff of dangers which arose through a third party's faulty
design of an end product constructed of Norton parts.

(R. p.254,

1. 2-3) . Norton is not chargeable with anticipating how its parts
might be assembled into containers designed by others. Norton had
no duty to warn plaintiff of any dangers posed due to a third
party's failure to purchase the proper parts to construct a
container of a certain design.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR
NORTON BECAUSE NSI FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF RULE 4-501 OF THE UTAH CODE OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE PROCEEDING BELOW
In the proceedings below, Norton filed its motion for
summary judgment on March 21, 1994. NSI's response to that motion
was due on or before March 31, 1994.
Judicial Administration.]

[Rule 4-501, Utah Code of

NSI did not file its memorandum in

opposition to Norton's motion for summary judgment until April 12,
1994, after Norton had already filed a notice to submit its motion
for summary judgment for decision.

Because NSI failed to comply

with Rule 4-501, the lower court should have granted Norton's

4

motion for summary judgment on the basis that it was unopposed.
Because Norton's summary judgment motion went unopposed in the
proceedings below and NSI's opposition to Norton's summary judgment
was never properly

raised, this court

should

affirm

summary

judgment for Norton.
POINT II
APPELLANT NSI, AFTER SETTLING WITH THE ONLY PARTY
ADVERSE TO IT, IS NO LONGER IN THIS CASE AND HAS
NO STANDING TO APPEAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED IN
FAVOR OF A NONADVERSE CO-DEFENDANT
In the proceeding below, Norton moved for summary judgment.
After hearing argument from both Norton and NSI, the court granted
Norton's motion for summary judgment, holding that Norton was a
component part manufacturer whose component parts were not defective and that Norton therefore had no duty to warn plaintiff. NSI
thereafter settled with plaintiff.
NSI now attempts to appeal the summary judgment granted its
co-defendant Norton. NSI, however, having never filed a crossclaim
against Norton, was never adverse to Norton.

NSI therefore lacks

standing to appeal the summary judgment granted in favor of Norton.
That a party cannot appeal from a judgment granted in favor
of a nonadverse party is well-settled:
It is hornbook law that *a party may only appeal
to protect its own interests, and not those of a
coparty.' Stevenson, simply as co-defendant, may
not appeal the dismissal of an additional
defendant from Morrison-Knudsen's original claims,
without itself being a party-plaintiff to those
claims. This is so despite Stevenson's assertion
that its position may be affected in some way by

5

the ultimate resolution
claims against FSLIC.

of

Morrison-Knudsen's

Morrison-Knudsen Co, v. CHG Int'l. Inc>, 811 F.2d 1209, 1214 (9th
Cir. 1987). See also

Stockstill v. Petty Ray Geophysical, 888 F.2d

1493 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that employer, which did not file any
claim

against

co-defendant,

did not have standing

to appeal

dismissal of co-defendant from action).
The case of Justice v. CSX Transportation. Inc., 908 F.2d
119 (7th Cir. 1990), involving facts nearly identical to those of
the instant case, clearly illustrates this well-settled principle
of law.

In CSX, two co-defendant railroads, CSX and Amtrak,

settled with the plaintiff, the only party that had filed any claim
against them.

The defendant railroads then attempted to appeal

from summary judgment granted in favor of a third co-defendant
(farm bureau) against whom they had never filed a crossclaim in the
underlying action.

CSX thus presented a procedural situation

identical to that of the instant case.
In holding that the appellants had no standing to appeal
from summary judgment granted in favor of a co-defendant below, the
CSX court made several observations which are also applicable to
the instant case:
The railroads were brought into this case by the
plaintiff, and could have filed a cross-claim
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a) against the bureau,
seeking indemnification in the event that they
were forced or agreed to pay the whole or any part
of the plaintiff's claim; and then their presence
in the case would have survived their settlement
with plaintiff. But they did not file a crossclaim.
Their only status in the case was as
6

defendants. When they settled with the plaintiff
they resolved the only contest in which they were
involved.
Id. at 125. The CSX court held that appellants had no standing to
appeal the summary judgment granted to their co-defendant below:
[A] party cannot appeal from a judgment after it
has settled with the only party that had filed a
claim against it or against which it had filed a
claim. A party cannot appeal from the judgment
entered in favor of a nonadverse party, and having
failed to file a cross claim against the farm
bureau the railroads were not adversaries of the
bureau and could not appeal from a judgment in its
favor. These are large, experienced, and legally
sophisticated enterprises, and it is time they
learned to play by the rules.
More than a
technical point is at stake; the other parties
were entitled to assume that the settlement had
removed the railroads from any further proceeding
in the case. We dismiss the railroad's appeal.
Id.
The instant case presents the identical situation. NSI was
brought into the case by plaintiff and NSI's only status was as a
defendant.

When NSI settled with plaintiff it resolved the only

controversy in which it was involved.

NSI could have filed a

cross-claim against Norton, thereby making itself adverse to Norton
and giving itself standing to appeal a summary judgment granted in
favor of Norton.

NSI, however, failed to file any cross-claim.

NSI and Norton were never adverse parties and NSI simply cannot,
after settling out of the case, appeal the summary judgment granted
in favor of a nonadverse party.
Appellant argues that "the open courts provision, due
process, and equal protection require that NSI be given a *full and
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fair opportunity' to litigate the issues of Norton's proportionate
fault, including indemnity owed by Norton."
43•
every

Appellants Brief at

Yet, far from being deprived of such an opportunity, NSI had
occasion

to

underlying action.

file a cross-claim

against

Norton

in the

It simply failed to do so.

No injustice capable of repetition has occurred as NSI
suggests. NSI states that lf[u]nder the trial judges interpretation
of Sullivan

[853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993)], plaintiff's council can

build a case against the weakest defendant, stand by idly while
other defendants move for summary judgment, and force the remaining
defendant to pay the dismissed defendant's proportionate share of
the verdict." Appellant's Brief at 45. This contention is absurd.
A defendant's opportunity to assert claims against a co-defendant
to avoid paying that co-defendant's proportionate share of an award
is never placed at the mercy of a plaintiff's choice of which
defendant to prosecute more vigorously. This is what cross-claims
under Rule 14(a) are for.

NSI was afforded every opportunity to

assert its claims for indemnity against Norton in this case and
simply failed to avail itself of these opportunities.

Having now

settled with the plaintiff, NSI simply cannot appeal the grant of
summary judgment in favor of a nonadverse co-defendant.

8

POINT III
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT NORTON IS A
COMPONENT PART MANUFACTURER
RATHER THAN A
MANUFACTURER OF FINISHED CONTAINERS
Even if NSI had standing to appeal from the summary
judgment granted in favor of Norton, this court should affirm the
summary judgment granted below.

The lower court correctly held

that

"component

Norton

manufactured

only

containers could be assembled.

parts"

with

which

(R. p.252, 1. 20-21). Norton is in

the business of selling steel pails and lids of different varieties
which can be used by Norton's customers to make containers of
different characteristics depending on their needs.

Norton sold

parts to NSI without knowledge of the uses to which NSI intended to
put such parts. As the court below correctly noted, "NSI did not
consult with Norton concerning what product they would place in the
pail and as a matter of practice, NSI would package their own
product in the pail, close the container, apply a warning label
authored by NSI to the container and would ship the product to an
NSI customer without consulting with Norton at any step in that
process." (R. p.253, 1. 2-6)
Only NSI knew what characteristics the container it was
assembling would need to have.

This is so because "Norton was

never advised by NSI that the steel pail and components shipped to
NSI would contain . . . vapor pressure in the head space."
p.253, 1. 15-17).

(R.

If NSI had kept Norton better informed, Norton

could have sold NSI different lids which could accommodate vapor

9

pressure in the container.

However, because NSI did not consult

with Norton, it was NSI's responsibility to ensure that the parts
it purchased were appropriate for their intended purpose, and it
was NSI/s responsibility to warn its customers of any danger which
the assembled container filled with their product might present.
NSI states that "NSI specifies a certain size of container,
type of lid, color, etc, just as one might specify options on a
car."

However, specifying the type of pail and lid to be sent is

nothing like specifying optional features on a car, but rather
determines the purposes for which a container assembled of such
parts can safely be used.

If NSI had indicated that any pressure

would be present in the container they intended to assemble, Norton
could have sold them a "type of lid" which would safely accommodate
such pressure.

Only NSI knew the uses to which the ultimate

container would be put and it was their responsibility in assembling such a container to order the appropriate parts.

Norton is

not chargeable with ensuring that containers assembled of its parts
are not put to uses which place undue demands on any single
component.
NSI cites several "container" cases holding "container
manufacturers" liable for manufacturing defective containers which
do not perform the job they were designed for.
inapposite.

These cases are

The cases cited by NSI all involve manufacturers of

finished, assembled containers sold for a known purpose, and do not
address the "component parts" issue.

10

NSI cites the Utah case of Palmer v. Wasatch Chemical
Companyf 353 P.2d 985 (Utah 1960).

Palmer, however, involved a

defective finished container delivered to plaintiff filled with
acid.

Id. at 986.

The container was a one-piece carboy (glass

bottle), not constructed of component parts at all. Additionally,
the plaintiff in that case brought suit only against the seller of
the product contained within the carboy for its failure to exercise
ordinary care in inspecting the container and delivering its
product.

Id. at 985.

The manufacturer of the carboy was not a

defendant, and no defense involving "component part" law was ever
raised. Palmer simply never addressed the "component parts" issue
or any other issue relevant to this appeal.
NSI also cites the case of Van Duzer v. Shoshone Coca Cola
Bottling Co.. 714 P.2d 812 (Nev. 1987).

Again, Van Duzer involved

a glass Canada Dry bottle not constructed of any component parts.
No "component part" argument was ever raised by the parties or
addressed by the court.
Norton did not sell a "container" to NSI, but components
with which NSI constructed a container.

NSI's citation of cases

involving finished, completed containers, in which the issue of
"component parts" was never raised or addressed, does nothing to
support NSI's assertion that "Norton's pail and lid were not
*component parts,' but were completed 'containers.'"

Brief of

Appellant at 21. Norton is not a "container manufacturer," and the
cases cited by NSI are inapplicable.

11

The lower court correctly held that Norton was the manufacturer of the "component parts" of the pail.

(R. p.252, 1. 20-21)

POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT NORTON'S
COMPONENT PARTS WERE NOT DEFECTIVE
NSI states that the "lower court erred when it held that
Norton owed no duty to provide a safe product . . . [a]nyone who
sells a defective product is subject to liability for injuries
caused by that defective product." Brief of Appellant at 12. NSI,
however, has misread the courts holding.

The court below never

held that Norton had no duty to ensure its parts were not defective. Rather, the court correctly held that Norton's components in
fact were not defective, and Norton therefore had no duty to warn
plaintiff of dangers which might arise through another company's
use of its components.

(R. p.253, 1. 19 to p.254, 1. 3)

There is no dispute that Norton has a duty to ensure that
its components are not defective. There is no evidence to suggest,
however, that Norton breached this duty.

NSI argues that expert

testimony in this case creates a factual question as to whether
Norton's products were in a defective condition.

NSI attempts to

rely on the deposition testimony of Dr. Noel de Nevers in this
regard.

Dr. de Nevers, however, never expressed an opinion that

any of Norton's parts were defective, and NSI can cite to no
portion of Dr. de Nevers deposition to support this contention.
Additionally, NSI's own representative has testified that he has no
information indicating that there was anything wrong with the parts
12

supplied by Norton.

[Deposition of Dr. Fineman, pp.5, 81-82.] As

the lower court correctly noted:

"[e]ngineers from NSI had no

opinion that the steel pail components were defective.
in the case rendered such opinion."

No expert

(R. p.253, 1. 19-21.)

There is simply no evidence in the instant case that the
component parts were in a defective condition when they left
Norton.
NSI's allegations that the "container in the current case
was, in and of itself, dangerous," or that there is a factual
question of the "container being defective" do nothing to undermine
the lower court's grant of summary judgment. Brief of Appellant at
28, 34.

As the court below correctly noted, Norton did not

manufacture the "container," but rather manufactured a variety of
"component parts" with which different containers could be made by
other parties.

(R. p.252, 1. 20-21.)

If the "container" in this

case was unreasonably dangerous for the purpose for which it was
used, it is because NSI did not inform Norton of its specific needs
or itself ensure that the proper pail and lid were purchased to
construct an appropriate container.
Norton manufactured

There is no evidence that

or sold any defective part and there is

therefore no basis in law for a strict liability case against
Norton.

13

POINT V
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT NORTON, AS A
COMPONENT PART MANUFACTURER, HAD NO DUTY TO
ANTICIPATE HOW ITS COMPONENT PARTS MIGHT BE
ASSEMBLED BY OTHERS INTO FINAL PRODUCTS OR TO WARN
OF DANGERS WHICH ARISE THROUGH IMPROPER DESIGN OF
SUCH PRODUCTS BY THIRD PARTIES
Given the absence of evidence in the record suggesting
Norton's component parts were in any way defective, the lower court
correctly held that "under the circumstances . . . Norton did not
have a duty to warn" plaintiff of any danger he might have
encountered.

(R. p.254, 1. 2-3)

This is so because any danger

present arose not because any Norton product was unsafe, but
because

non-defective

Norton

parts were

incorporated

into a

container of faulty design.
Norton sold to NSI components with which a container could
be made. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that these
parts were defective.

A manufacturer of non-defective component

parts cannot be held liable for injury caused by another party's
incorporation of such components
ultimate product.

into a defectively

designed

See Sperry v. Bauermeister, Inc., 786 F.Supp.

1512 (E.D. Mo. 1992); Miller v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 811
F.Supp 1286 (E.D. Tenn. 1992); Cropper v Reao Distribution Center.
Inc.. 542 F.Supp. 1142 (D. Del. 1982).

Thus, the manufacturer of

non-defective component parts has no duty to anticipate dangers
which might arise through another party's misuse of its components
in some end product, and no duty to warn users of such end products
of these dangers. As the Sperry court noted, [t]o hold a component
14

part manufacturer liable in such a situation would *cast it in the
role of insurer./M

Sperry. 786 F.Supp. at 517 (citation omitted).

In the instant caser the lower court correctly noted that
there had been no evidence presented that the parts manufactured by
Norton were in any way defective.
granting Summary Judgment at 3-4.

(R. p.253, 1. 19-21.)

Order

In view of the fact that

Norton's products were not defective, the court below correctly
held that "Norton did not have a duty to warn" plaintiff of dangers
present due to a third parties use of the wrong components in
assembling a container.

(R. p.254, 1. 2-3.)

NSI, in its brief, states that the "lower court erred when
it held that Norton owed no duty to provide a safe product . . .
[a]nyone who sells a defective product is subject to liability for
injuries caused by that defective product." Brief of Appellant at
12. NSI then argues that cases relied on by Norton never held that
component part manufacturers have no duty to sell non-defective
products, only that the products in those particular cases were not
in fact defective.

Brief of Appellant at 17.

NSI, however, has completely missed the point. There is no
dispute that Norton had a duty not to manufacture and sell
defective parts. The court below certainly never held that no such
duty was owed, and Norton has never taken this position.

Rather,

the court below held that Norton's products in fact were not
defective, and that under these "circumstances . . . Norton did not
have a duty to warn."

(R. p.254, 1. 2-3)

15

(emphasis added).

Norton's duty was to sell non-defective parts and Norton discharged
this duty.
The dispute here is whether a manufacturer of parts which
are not defective has a duty to warn individuals of possible
dangers associated with products negligently manufactured from such
parts.

The court below correctly applied the law in holding that

no such duty is owed.
NSI's arguments with regard to Norton's duty to manufacture
non-defective parts may be accepted as true without undermining the
lower court's grant of summary judgment.
held that Norton owed no

The lower court never

duty to ensure its parts were not

defective, and did not base its grant of summary judgment on such
a conclusion.

The court below held only that, given the lack of

evidence that Norton's parts were defective, Norton had no duty to
anticipate how its parts might be used or to warn plaintiff of
possible dangers presented by a container assembled by another
party.

The duty to warn of any danger presented by the completed

pail assembled by NSI of Norton parts rested squarely with NSI.
Norton discharged the only duty it owed to plaintiff:

to ensure

that the component parts it manufactured were not in and of
themselves defective.
CONCLUSION
It is well-settled that a party has no standing to appeal
from a judgment granted in favor of another non-adverse party.
When NSI settled with plaintiff, it resolved the only dispute in
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which it was involved.

NSI lacks standing to appeal from summary

judgment granted in favor of Norton, a non-adverse co-defendant.
Even if NSI had standing to appeal from the summary
judgment granted Norton, NSI has failed to demonstrate that any
issue of facts exists which would preclude summary judgment in this
case. The lower court's grant of summary judgment was premised on
the fact that there had been absolutely no evidence offered that
any of the products supplied by Norton were defective.

Any

dangerous condition encountered by plaintiff in this case resulted
from NSI's failure to order the proper parts with which to build an
appropriate container for its product.

Norton is not chargeable

with ensuring that purchasers of Norton parts use those parts to
construct containers appropriate for their intended uses. There is
simply no evidence in this case to suggest that any Norton part was
defective when sold.
For the foregoing reasons, NSI's appeal of the summary
judgment granted

in favor of Norton should be dismissed and

Norton's summary judgment affirmed.
Dated this ^^T^P

day of May>ol995.
STRONG A HANNI

M. Belrts
Robert L. Janicki
Michael S. Johnson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
B. W. Norton Manufacturing
108190bc
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